

**“RELATIONS BETWEEN IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN  
EUROPE”**

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Migration, which is one of the most common social processes in the world today, brings a number of both benefits and challenges. Unfortunately, in recent years and especially in receiving countries, there has been a growing conviction that migration is a source of problems such as crime, poverty or lower social cohesion. Many opinions are formed based on stereotypes or unverified information repeated in the media. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that attitudes towards migrants and migration in Europe and the United States are today more negative than at any time since World War II. At the same time, a world without migration and migrants simply would not exist. We thus need to search for new theoretical concepts which would help to solve this challenge. One of the solutions worth considering is a better interconnection between immigration and integration policies, which, together, form part of a broadly understood migration policy. In the past, the two policies were implemented separately, which is one of the reasons for the current problems. Forgetting or consciously forgoing integration activities and subordinating immigration to the needs of the labour market in the hope that migrants will return home after some time was a mistake. We must draw conclusions and not repeat the mistakes of the past. This particularly concerns countries which are now transforming into immigration hubs, such as those of Central and Eastern Europe. The migration and refugee crisis in Europe in 2015–2016 gave a new urgency to the issue of immigration and integration policies on the continent. Political decisions, first to let in all those seeking international protection and then to attempt to keep them outside European Union borders, have strongly divided leaders and public opinions in the EU. This book takes a step back in order to reflect on the decision-making processes in immigration and integration policies in Europe, not only in recent years but also in the last few decades and regarding not only refugees but also migrant workers, family migrants and all other categories of international migrants. It aims to contribute to the theoretical and practical debate regarding immigration and integration policies by arguing that – contrary to what is often assumed – immigration policy should not be treated as having precedence over integration policy. In fact, the present migration and refugee crisis and several other decisive moments in Europe’s immigration history have demonstrated that it is the integration policy and its effectiveness which later determine a given state’s admissions policy. Integration policy can thus be equally as important as or even take precedence over immigration policy. The answer to the question of how many people a given country plans and is able to integrate

can determine its immigration policies. Consequently, this book focuses on relations between immigration and integration policies. The fact that integration outcomes can influence future immigration policies has been acknowledged since at least the 1980s, especially following the canonical writings of Tomas Hammar (1985, 1990, 1992) and Brochman and Hammar (1999). However, integration policy has often been treated as a subsection of immigration policy (Hammar 1985, 2010), as something that comes chronologically later or as an (often late) reaction to the inflow of foreigners (Messina 2007). We assume that the two are separate but related policies. Immigration policy – focused on admissions – is understood here as the state’s activities aimed at controlling the rules of entry and stay on its territory of people who are not citizens of the country, in order to obtain the optimum scale and structure of the inflow of foreigners. Integration policy is defined as the state’s actions aimed at achieving a dynamic and bi- directional process of mutual adaptation (adjustment) of immigrants and the receiving society, so that the potential of foreigners in the economy and society can be utilised optimally for both parties. We thus follow in the footsteps of a number of scholars and, in recent decades, the European Union (European Commission 2004, 2005, for example; see also Duszczyk 2011) in underlining that integration is a two- or three- way process which also demands some adjustment on the part of the receiving society. Both policies may be formalised as strategic documents, but the absence of a strategic document does not mean the absence of policies as such and is sometimes a policy statement of its own. This book is the result of our analysis of decision- making processes regarding migration in several key moments of Europe’s postwar history: from the guestworker period of the 1950s to early 1970s, to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015–2016. Analysis of factors taken into consideration by states in key moments when immigration policy was (re)formulated shows that Europe is moving away from rational, economic arguments and towards more political ones. In the years of the guestworker period, it was the objective needs of the labour market which dictated immigration policy. Other areas of migration policy, most notably integration policy, were largely nonexistent and the subject was nonpolitical and managed by state bureaucrats barely influenced by public opinion. Nevertheless, some scholars (notably Hammar 1992) believed that, as early as the 1970s, some influence of public opinion on decision- making was visible and the end of the guestworker policy in many countries was the result not only of the economic crisis but also of perceived problems with the integration of newcomers. In the 1980s, some countries responded to these problems with elements of integration policy, for example the somewhat paradoxically named ‘temporary integration’ in Germany, which meant that workers had rights linked with the labour market, such as unemployment benefits or trade- union membership but that no steps were taken towards their legal or cultural integration (Hammar 1985). By the 1990s, the politicisation of migration issues in Western

Europe, which had already begun in the 1970s, was irrevocable (Messina 2007). The period preceding the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 was an interesting case of decision-making in immigration policy. The enlargement of the EU by ten countries, including eight from Central and Eastern Europe, raised public fears in neighbouring countries, especially Germany, regarding the potential mass inflow of workers and persons who would burden the social security system. A majority of the German population at the time was in favour of limiting or stopping immigration from Central and Eastern Europe. The decisions of political leaders reflected these fears, but – in part due to the nature of the accession negotiations, with European institutions acting as quasi-impartial brokers and basing their proposals on objective economic factors and migration forecasts – evidence-based factors still played a significant role in decision-making. Nevertheless, some authors believe that the delay in opening up the German labour market to new EU citizens was not justified by economic factors; rather, they believe that public fears were the main argument (Elsner and Zimmermann 2013). The 'refugee crisis' of 2015–2016, the next period when European countries had to make decisions regarding a major inflow of newcomers, seems to be a time when the decisions of particular states were based even less on objective factors. The number of asylum applications was certainly not a determining factor, as some of the most affected countries, such as Germany, were also initially the most refugee-welcoming ones, while countries not frequently chosen by refugees, notably those in Central and Eastern Europe, adopted an unwelcoming attitude and discouraged refugees from applying for international protection. The growing anti-immigration sentiments and the securitisation and criminalisation of migration issues, fuelled in part by right-wing politics, seem to have contributed to stark changes in the positions of the governments of, for example, Germany and Sweden, by 2016. Significantly for this book, the issue of possibilities for immigrant integration was also a key argument. Previous failures in this field led directly to a limitation on the numbers of newcomers, which was stated directly, for example, by the government of Sweden. These events demonstrate an increasing focus on issues of migrant integration in Europe. However, the relations between immigration and integration policies remain under-investigated and frequently overlooked when making fundamental political decisions. Hence this book aims not only to draw attention to the importance of integration policies but also to show that the effects of these policies frequently determine attitudes to immigration and immigration policies later on. Integration policy can, then, be treated as a primary concern or, at least, as being equally as important as immigration policy; it should not be seen – as many policy-makers and academics have done – as a nonfundamental and secondary subsection of immigration policy. Looking at migration policies in Europe today, one cannot help but see chaos. It seems that, in many respects, they have gone from labour-market-based decisions to decisions which are highly politicised and

not based on solid rational premises. This is obvious when we look at Western Europe. In the 1950s to 1970s, the subject of immigration did not seem highly controversial, and decisions were made based on the needs of the labour market. In the 1980s and, especially, the 1990s, the issue became more politicised in many countries, and decision-makers started balancing between the needs of labour markets and public fears. This was the situation, for example, during subsequent enlargements of the European Union, when countries of the 'West' had to decide when to grant new EU members access to their labour markets and did so in part based on economic arguments and in part due to public fears of a wave of 'Polish plumbers' inundating Western Europe. Later, especially during the so-called 'migration crisis' of 2015–2016, decisions seem to have been made almost entirely on emotion (first on humanitarian grounds and then in acknowledgement of public fears) or politics (how to gain more voters using these fears). Central and Eastern Europe, which were just becoming a region of immigration, went through a similar transformation at accelerated speed. Labour migrants had been quietly welcomed over the previous two decades without much public debate, but the so-called migration crisis brought a sudden politicisation of the subject and a fierce anti-refugee reaction from the governments and society – this in spite of the fact that the region (with the exception of Hungary) was not directly affected. Part of this politicisation seems to be a reaction to the lack or failures of integration policies (in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the perceived failures of integration policies in other countries, as presented by politicians and the media). A thorough discussion on how we create and how we should be creating migration policies is thus very urgent. This book aims to be part of that debate. In this chapter, to provide a context for the more practical discussions in subsequent ones, we summarise the main theoretical thinking on migration and integration policies and the links between them. We argue strongly in favour of treating the issues of integration and integration policy as equally important as or even more important than immigration policy. We also demonstrate that, in contradiction to what has been happening in Europe in recent decades, policies in both domains have to be created in tandem as their effects will be felt far beyond the field which a policy is meant to influence. In this text, migration policy is understood broadly as a reaction of the state to migration processes – both immigration and emigration. It covers: • admission policy, which is understood as allowing foreigners onto the territory of a given state and permitting them to stay and especially to access the labour market (immigration policy); • actions directed at emigrants from the state – especially with the aim of attracting them back – as well as diaspora policies; • actions aimed at stemming illegal immigration, including human trafficking and human smuggling; and • issues related to the inclusion of foreigners in the host society, including their social, political and other rights – in other words, integration policy. In most of the literature, immigration and integration policies are analysed separately, although

they are often included in a broadly understood migration policy. It is also often assumed that actions taken within integration policy – and their results – influence regulations regarding the inflow of foreigners into a given state only in a very limited way – policies intended to control and manage the arrival of potential immigrants also have a limited impact. Integration policy is thus considered as reactive: it is reacting to situations brought about by immigration policy. Such an approach can be found in the canonical works of Tomas Hammar (1985b, 1985c, 2010): migration policy is treated as built of two components – the regulation of the inflow of foreigners to a given state (immigration policy) and actions taken by that state in relation to immigrants (integration policy). Anthony Messina (2007), who analysed the relations between migration and politics in Europe, takes a similar approach. Such a view appears to be a simplification. It should be assumed that there are important relations between immigration and integration policies and that these relations may determine, to a large degree, how a state approaches the inflow of foreigners. This would mean that the degree of openness towards foreigners may significantly depend on the level of integration of those immigrants who are already living in the state. Obviously, migration is a phenomenon which cannot be fully controlled, except in extreme circumstances. This means that every state should have both an immigration and an integration policy. It is key that the two be tied, so that actions within one policy are coordinated with and result from the other. If an integration policy proves ineffective and social cohesion on a given territory is under threat, this should lead to a change of policies: either the limiting of immigration, a change in the direction of migration flows or a reform of existing integration policies which have proved ineffective in the case of particular groups. The success of integration policy should lead to the liberalisation of migration policy and the opening up of a country to a larger number of foreigners. The experiences of recent years, especially the so- called ‘migration crisis’ in Europe and the USA’s policies under President Donald Trump, demonstrate clearly that it is impossible to have an open immigration policy without an effective integration policy. We should expect that political decisions on the opening or closing of borders and labour markets to foreigners will increasingly be made depending on the degrees of integration of the foreigners who are already in the country – although it should be underlined that frequently other political processes altogether, not the integration of foreigners, determine policies. A good example is the deporting of some undocumented but well- integrated and long- established migrants from the USA, done clearly for political reasons . Public opinion will force politicians to make decisions regarding foreigners based on their own experiences or those of others, as pictured in the media. Objective factors, such as the needs of the labour market or demographic processes, can be expected to play a much smaller role. It is hard to imagine many societies agreeing to an open immigration policy if integration policies are not successful. Governments which realise the

benefits of immigration will have to devote more resources and attention to integration policies. Ideally, migration policy formulation should follow that of a general migration doctrine and should take the form of a document accepted by the government or parliament. This helps to present it to society and – perhaps even more importantly – helps government and local government officials to act in accordance with its spirit when implementing not only migration policy but also other regulations which impact on the presence and rights of foreigners. In Hammar's (1992: 256) opinion, a migration policy is not necessary when the inflow of foreigners is small and thus usually not of interest to politicians. However, such a lack of policy is also a kind of policy by omission. A migration policy is necessary and is usually created when the inflow of foreigners becomes large. Usually the goal is to halt it and gain a sense of control (which is frequently just a sense – cf. Castles et al. 2014). It can also be created to steer the inflow of migrants who have been deemed necessary in the labour market or for other reasons. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of migration policy, especially in the long term. If we measure against goals set out in laws or other documents, we will find that many have failed. As an example, we can cite the policies of Germany (which, in the years 1950–1970, wanted to import labour, not people) or Australia (which wanted to keep its 'White Australia Policy' in the years after World War II ). In both cases, reality proved far removed from what was planned. However, we certainly cannot say that these countries or societies failed. Both have managed to develop relatively cohesively. It is often the case that officially stated goals of policy are different to their unofficial, forecasted or even welcomed effects (cf. Castles 2004). Although it is difficult to measure the success or failure of migration policies, certain elements are worth looking at: maintaining external and internal security; economic development, especially the situation in the labour market; maintaining an optimal demographic balance in society; and social cohesion. If success in these fields is to be achieved, an intense integration policy is a necessary part of migration policy (as well as a selective immigration policy). This – again – demonstrates that both policies should be analysed and conducted together.